

# Japan Opens the ¥1,700 Trillion Vault

Timothy R. Doyle | March 2026

## Executive Summary

For three decades following the 1990 bubble burst, Japanese households and corporations engaged in a rational survival strategy: defensive hoarding. For households, cash was the primary hedge in a deflationary world where wages stagnated and the lifetime employment social contract eroded. For highly levered corporations, fortifying balance sheets and hoarding cash was a necessary defense against systemic risk. This collective deleveraging created a massive vault of highly liquid capital — ¥1,100 trillion in household deposits and ¥600 trillion in corporate cash and strategic cross-shareholdings. Together, these pools represent over ¥1,700 trillion — more than the ¥1,300 trillion market capitalization of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).

Today, macroeconomic and structural catalysts are putting this capital back into motion. The return of inflation — and negative real rates in particular — has broken down the multi-decade long deflationary mindset. Simultaneously, unprecedented TSE mandates are pushing corporations to deploy idle capital, while expanded Nippon Individual Savings Account (NISA) tax incentives are accelerating the flow of household savings into risk assets. The ¥1,700 trillion vault is now open.

However, with the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) trading at ~19.8x earnings, passive capital flows into the broad index offer limited margin of safety against Bank of Japan (BOJ) policy errors, yen volatility, or interest rate shocks. The opportunity has migrated from the index to individual stock selection.

The current macroeconomic stress test of Japanese *domestic* companies — sticky inflation and a historically weak yen — has revealed where true value lies. This paper outlines an **antifragile** strategy targeting those companies that have proven their ability to outcompete rivals during this stress test, offering asymmetric upside across three specific scenarios:

- **A Weak Yen Moat:** Dominant domestic firms are using pricing power to outcompete sub-scale rivals struggling with import inflation.
- **An Interest Rate Hedge:** Firms with fortress balance sheets generate interest income that offsets valuation compression should rates rise.
- **A "Free" Call Option:** If the yen normalizes, these firms capture a massive margin windfall as input costs collapse while pricing remains sticky.

This paper details the structural forces driving this historic capital mobilization and provides a stock-selection framework designed to capture asymmetric upside, regardless of Japan's macroeconomic trajectory.

## The Power of Incentives

### Three Forces Driving Capital Reallocation in Japan

*“I think I’ve been in the top five percent of my age cohort almost all my adult life in understanding the power of incentives, and yet I’ve always underestimated that power.”<sup>1</sup>*

— Charlie Munger

Munger’s observation captures what is happening in Japan today. The mobilization of ¥1,700 trillion in capital — ¥1,100 trillion in household deposits and ¥600 trillion in cross-shareholdings, cash reserves, and short-term securities — is a rational response to radically restructured economic incentives.

Three distinct forces are driving the re-pricing of Japanese equities:

- **Force #1 — Macro Catalysts:** Negative real rates, yen undervaluation, and labor scarcity.
- **Force #2 — Structural Reforms:** Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI)/TSE governance reforms and Nippon Individual Savings Account (NISA) tax incentives.
- **Force #3 — Corporate Fundamentals:** Pricing power and fortress balance sheets.

**These three forces work sequentially:**

**Macro catalysts** put capital into motion → **Structural reforms** direct the capital flow → **Corporate fundamentals** determine the capital flow destination.

These forces are measurable, directional, and converging. The question is not whether capital is being reallocated — that process has already begun. The question is: **Do individual Japanese equities offer asymmetric upside at current valuations?**

To answer this, we start with the macro catalysts.

## Force #1 — Macro Catalysts

### The Convergence

Three specific drivers are converging to dismantle the status quo. Individually, any of these forces is disruptive. Together, they create a structural environment that destroys the utility of cash and compels redeployment of capital into risk assets:


- I. **Negative Real Rates:** The Penalty on Cash
- II. **Yen Undervaluation:** A Stress Test of Pricing Power
- III. **Labor Scarcity:** The Incentive for Automation

First, the power of negative real rates.

## I. Negative Real Rates—The Penalty on Cash

Japanese real rates during this structural transition to inflation have been *more* negative (**Figure 1**) than at any point since the 1990 Nikkei bubble burst. While the US Fed has begun easing, the BOJ has deliberately kept the policy rate well below inflation — a strategy designed to purge *three decades of deflationary psychology* and to establish inflationary *expectations* as the new normal.


**Figure 1: BOJ Policy vs. Japan CPI - BOJ Interest Rate Policy<sup>2</sup>**



### The Reflation Playbook

The BOJ's strategy mirrors Fed Chair Ben Bernanke's post Global Financial Crisis (GFC) "reflation" playbook. Bernanke — a student of the Great Depression and Japan's 1990s policy errors — used aggressive quantitative easing to drive real interest rates modestly negative during the early 2010s (**Figure 2**), compelling capital out of cash and into risk assets.

Japan failed to do this throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Positive real rates incentivized cash hoarding. Three decades later, the BOJ is finally correcting that policy error. By making it expensive to hold cash, the BOJ is pushing households to transition from passive savers to active investors. This push applies equally to corporations, where an inflationary "tax" is painful for companies hoarding cash, compelling them toward more productive uses of idle capital.

**Figure 2: Fed Funds vs. US CPI - US Interest Rate Policy<sup>3</sup>**

## II. Yen Undervaluation—A Stress Test of Pricing Power


The yen — trading presently at ~¥155 to the dollar — is undervalued (**Figure 4**) relative to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). This dislocation stems from a policy divergence: During the 2022 global inflation shock, while the Fed hiked rates to 5% to combat inflation, the BOJ held nominal rates flat. This allowed inflation to push real rates even *more* negative, fueling a "carry trade" that sold yen and bought dollars, pushing the currency to historic undervaluation.

### Purchasing Power Parity Dislocation—The Big Mac Story

The most relatable evidence of this structural discount is the extreme divergence from PPP, as illustrated by the ultimate American symbol of "Bigger is Better" — The Big Mac.

*The Economist* magazine developed The Big Mac Index in 1986 to benchmark currency values by comparing the price of a Big Mac across different countries. A Big Mac is nearly identical in Tokyo and New York. **Figure 3** highlights the magnitude of the disconnect. In dollar terms, the price of a Japanese Big Mac has flatlined for 30 years, while the price of its American equivalent has more than *tripled*.

**Figure 3: The Big Mac Index (US vs Japan)<sup>4</sup>**




Source: The Economist Big Mac Index

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In an efficient market, identical goods should cost roughly the same in dollar terms. When they do not, the currency is mis-priced. As **Figure 4** confirms using Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Penn World Table data — the yen is currently trading at a multi-decade low relative to its fair value.

**Figure 4: JPY/USD & PPP Estimate<sup>5</sup>**



Source: FRED (AEXJPUS), World Bank (OECD PPP), Penn World Table 11.0

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
## The Embedded Call Option

This disparity creates a structural arbitrage. While you cannot buy 10,000 Big Macs in Tokyo and sell them in New York, you *can* exploit this pricing gap through equities. By funding purchases in US dollars and holding the JPY-denominated assets *unhedged*, buying domestic Japanese stocks provides an embedded call option on the yen. If the currency mean-reverts, the dollar investor captures a dual return: equity appreciation plus the currency windfall. At a minimum, the extreme yen undervaluation offers a historic margin of safety.

## Pricing Power


**Figure 5** reveals a critical insight obscured by a weak yen. To dollar-based investors, Japanese prices appear stagnant, but the domestic reality is different. In yen terms, McDonald's Japan has demonstrated robust pricing power since 2006, raising prices much faster than domestic CPI — from ¥250 in 2006 to ¥480 by 2025<sup>6</sup>. While the prolonged 2022 currency shock compressed margins, price hikes passed import costs to consumers, driving margin recovery by 2023.

**Figure 5: Big Mac Real Pricing Power (local currency vs CPI)<sup>7</sup>**



## III. Labor Scarcity—The Incentive for Automation

The third macro force is demographic and irreversible: Japan's labor pool has shrunk 8% since 2008, forcing companies to compete for scarce labor (**Figure 6**). This scarcity has driven nominal base wages up 4.7% (Q3 2025) — the fastest pace in decades — even as *real* wage growth remains flat.

**Figure 6: Rising Nominal Wages Meet a Shrinking Workforce<sup>8</sup>**

### Automation or Stagnation


Japan's demographic decline has created a permanent productivity crisis. With the labor pool shrinking 8% since 2008, corporations can no longer solve growth problems by adding headcount. Automation is not optional; it is the only path to growth. Combined with negative real rates (the penalty on cash) and nominal wage inflation (the mounting price of doing nothing), management is left with no choice — capital must move out of cash reserves and into the automation cycle.

### The Capex Response: Substituting Capital for Labor

Corporate Japan is not merely observing this demographic collapse; it is actively spending to survive it. The mandate has shifted from hoarding cash to aggressively substituting labor with capital.

Overall capital expenditure has accelerated well past depreciation (**Figure 7**), indicating that Corporate Japan is expanding capacity, not managing decline.


**Figure 7: Japan Inc. CapEx vs Depreciation<sup>9</sup>**



### The Digital Substitution

But where is this capital going? The data reveals a critical qualitative shift: Japan Inc. is replacing people with automation. As **Figure 8** illustrates, Software CapEx is growing at an exponential rate compared to traditional physical CapEx, surging to record highs as companies automate previously labor-intensive roles.


**Figure 8: Japan Inc. Real SW CapEx & Physical CapEx Growth<sup>10</sup>**



## The Productivity Wedge

This structural investment is already altering the macroeconomic math. Historically, Japan's GDP growth was tethered to total hours worked. Today, we are witnessing the emergence of a "Productivity Wedge." As **Figure 9** demonstrates, automation spending is resulting in higher productivity. Corporations are successfully substituting capital for labor, causing value-added per worker to rise significantly faster than wages. Companies are using automation to manufacture their own growth, even in a shrinking economy.

**Figure 9: The Productivity Wedge (Indexed 2000 = 100)<sup>11</sup>**



This automation wave is deflationary for unit costs but inflationary for margins. However, execution is binary: The leaders will expand margins, while the laggards will be crushed by labor shortages. This supports the 8% ROE sustainability thesis — but only for companies actually executing on automation. The "average" 8% ROE masks a massive dispersion between the winners and the losers.

## Force #2—Structural Reforms


### Government Incentives: Forcing the Vault Open

#### The Great Divergence - Households vs. Japan Inc.


To understand the magnitude of the available capital, one must understand what has happened over more than three decades within Japan. The bursting of the 1990 bubble created a massive divergence between the wealth of the Japanese Corporation (**Figure 10 and 11**) and the Japanese Household (**Figure 12 and 13**). While households suffered a "lost generation" of wealth *destruction* — seeing nominal land values vaporize from ¥1,485 trillion at the end of 1990 to just ¥785 trillion through 2024 — Corporate Japan used the same period to transform itself. In a deflationary environment with flat wages, corporations grew real retained earnings 4.4x — from

¥130 trillion to ¥579 trillion — accumulated massive equity holdings through cross-shareholdings, and fortified cash reserves.

**Figure 10: The Rise of the Japan Inc. Fortress Balance Sheet<sup>12</sup>**




**Figure 11: Japan Inc. Vault Liquid Assets<sup>13</sup>**



While Japan Inc. was fortifying its balance sheet, the Japanese household was forced into a completely different posture.

**Figure 12: Japan Household Wealth in *Nominal* Terms<sup>14</sup>**



The Japanese household's retreat into cash spans two distinct post-1990 eras.


### **Era 1: The Deflationary Cushion and the Rationality of Stagnation (1990–2020)**

For 30 years, hoarding cash was not financial illiteracy; it was a survival strategy. BOJ Policy Board member Hajime Takata noted in an October 2025<sup>15</sup> speech that household risk aversion was "completely rational" under the old lifetime employment system. Cash was the primary hedge in a deflationary economy where salaries were stagnant but employment was implicitly guaranteed. Sheltered by these chronic deflationary pressures, the public built a nominal ¥1,057 trillion cash vault by 2020 that suffered almost no reduction in real purchasing power. By avoiding the equity market, households avoided risk *and* paid no penalty in real terms.

### **Era 2: The Inflation Shock (2021–Present)**

Today, that social contract has collapsed, and the era of the deflationary cushion has ended abruptly. The sudden return of inflation fundamentally broke the rationale for hoarding cash. Between 2021 and 2024, households saved even more, driving nominal cash balances to an all-time high of ¥1,135 trillion. But the perceived safety of cash has evaporated. In real terms (**Figure 13**), the purchasing power of that cash peaked at ¥1,096 trillion in 2021 and has since been reduced to ¥1,046 trillion. In just 36 months, inflation destroyed ¥50 trillion in real household wealth.

With inflation returning and the guarantee of lifetime employment eroding, the "rational" move has flipped from saving to investing. Takata observes that for the first time in a generation, Japan is finally equipped with the "two wheels of the cart" — the alignment of economic conditions and government policy — necessary to drive a successful transition into risk assets.

**Figure 13: Japan Household Wealth in *Real* Terms<sup>16</sup>**

## The Household Vault—NISA incentives

To facilitate this transition, the government has fundamentally redesigned the Nippon Individual Savings Account (NISA) program, turning a savings tool into an engine for national wealth creation.

### A New Generation of Investors

Adoption is being driven by a generational divide. While older generations still carry the "lingering trauma" of the 1990 bubble, younger investors are unscarred. Data from the Japan Exchange Group (JPX) shows that nearly **50%** of new NISA money is coming from those in their 40s and younger — a cohort that views inflation, not deflation, as the primary threat to their future.<sup>17</sup>

### Addressing the "Capital Flight" Risk

One may argue that NISA simply funnels Japanese savings into US Tech stocks and other global assets. While passive flows do favor global indices, the active "Growth Quota" reveals a strong home bias: **40%** of these active investments — more than ¥10 trillion — have flowed into individual Japanese stocks, primarily high-yield dividend payers.<sup>18</sup>

Even with a significant amount of NISA account funds being invested globally, the sheer scale of the mobilization means the absolute yen amount hitting the TSE is a massive marginal buyer for small-to-mid-cap valuations.

### Early Innings

This re-rating has occurred with only 2.6% of household assets shifting from savings to investment (¥31 trillion). This low penetration rate isn't a failure; it's a measure of the staggering amount of "dry powder" still sitting in zero-yield accounts. With the reality of inflation continuing to vaporize the real purchasing power of those accounts, the structural migration of capital has only just begun. The pain of inflation has forced the vault open,

and risk assets — among them undervalued Japanese equities — are just one beneficiary of this flow.

## The Corporate Vault—METI & TSE Reforms

The catalyst for unlocking the corporate balance sheets is the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In 2023, the TSE moved from passive observation to active enforcement, targeting companies with a Price-to-Book Ratio (PBR) below 1.0x.

### The “Name and Shame” Regime

This is not just rhetoric; the data confirms a massive behavioral shift. In 2025, a record 124 companies delisted — many via management buyouts — choosing to go private rather than face the scrutiny of the new regime.

- **Unwinding Cross-Shareholdings (Mochiai):** The fuel for current shareholder return boom is the liquidation of these legacy stakes. This cash is being redirected into buybacks and dividends, structurally boosting ROE across the index.
- **Record Buybacks:** Share repurchases hit ¥18 trillion in 2024 and exceeded ¥20 trillion in 2025.
- **Compliance:** As of late 2025, 90% of Prime Market companies had disclosed explicit plans to improve their P/B ratios.

### Aligning Management with Shareholders

There is also a quiet revolution in the boardroom. JPX CEO Hiromi Yamaji highlighted in a November 2025 presentation<sup>19</sup> that stock-based compensation has more than doubled, from 14% of executive pay to **33%**. Management is no longer just "shamed" into performance; they are now personally incentivized to drive equity value.

## The ¥1,700 Trillion Question: Are The Incentives Priced In?

The evidence from both the household and corporate sectors is unambiguous: macroeconomic pain and structural mandates have jointly forced the combined ¥1,700 trillion vault open. Even a modest 5% reallocation of this trapped capital represents ¥85 trillion actively seeking a home in risk assets.

However, capital flow does not guarantee returns. If the market has already priced in this movement of capital, investors paying 19.8x P/E for the passive TOPIX are betting on earnings growth that Japan Inc. has rarely sustained.

To find a true margin of safety, we must abandon the passive index and look below the surface at the underlying corporate fundamentals.

## Force #3—Fundamentals

### Pricing Power—The Profitability Pivot

In the aftermath of the 1990 bubble, Japanese corporations played a thirty-year game of defense in a deflationary world. With the return of structural inflation, Japan Inc. has regained a critical long-dormant lever: **Pricing Power**.

### The End of the Deflationary “Social Contract”

To global observers, Japan’s 2–3% CPI appears “modest” — a welcome normalization of a once-stagnant economy. Domestically, however, it is a cost-of-living shock that has shattered the Japanese thirty-year social contract of stable prices.

The data confirms this psychological break. According to the 2025 annual survey released in February 2026, the Engel’s Coefficient (the proportion of household budget spent on food) reached an annual average of **28.6%** — the highest level in 44 years<sup>20</sup>. In the monthly December 2025 survey, worker’s household food expenditure reached a staggering **31.1%** of consumption expenditures.

This is the ultimate behavioral catalyst. For three decades, holding cash was a rational strategy because its purchasing power was a constant. Today, the sheer scale of asset erosion — where the most basic necessity, food, now commands nearly a third of total spending — removes that sanctuary.

The psychological catalyst driving this ¥1,100 trillion of household cash off the sidelines is best explained by behavioral economists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. In their foundational 1979 paper on Prospect Theory<sup>21</sup>, they demonstrated that “losses loom larger than gains. The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount.” For thirty years, holding cash in Japan resulted in zero nominal loss, reinforced during the thirteen-year period between 1990 and 2003 when equities lost 80% of their value, anchoring the psychological incentive to avoid equity risk. But today, the return of inflation guarantees a steady erosion of purchasing power, and the acute aggravation of this guaranteed loss is acting as a sharp incentive, breaking the decades-long inertia of the Japanese household.

But the exact same cost-of-living shock that penalizes the consumer provides corporations with a rare social license to raise prices. For decades, Japanese firms were paralyzed by an implicit stable price compact with households, absorbing input costs and compressing their own margins rather than risking backlash. Because the current inflationary trend is universal and that compact is definitively broken, firms are no longer shamed for passing on costs — they are using the crisis to permanently reset their pricing architecture.


## The Proof is in the Margins

The evidence that corporations are successfully navigating this shift is found in two distinct breakouts:

### I. Gross Margins (The Pricing Power Test)


The true test of pricing power is the ability to maintain margins during an input cost spike. As **Figure 14** illustrates, Japan Inc. maintained and even *expanded* margins during the severe cost-push shock from 2021-2024 driven by a weak yen and commodity inflation. In previous cycles, this would have crushed profitability. In the Non-Manufacturing sector, margins have hit record highs, proving that inflation is being passed through to the consumer effectively.

**Figure 14—Japan Gross Profit Margins (1990—2024)<sup>22</sup>**



### II. Ordinary Profits (The Hidden Yield)

Operating Margins tell only half the story. The true breakout is in Ordinary Profits — a Japanese GAAP metric that includes operating profit plus non-operating income (dividends, interest). As **Figure 15** illustrates, this profitability wedge — fueled by the fortress balance sheets — has surged to a post-WWII high. Investors focused solely on Operating Income miss this “Hidden Yield” that supplements the regular earnings power of Japan Inc.

**Figure 15—Ordinary Profits Break Out Above Operating Profits<sup>23</sup>**

### The Valuation Illusion

At first glance, these fundamentals seem priced in. The TOPIX currently trades at a P/E of 19.8x (January 2026), suggesting that the broad Japan investment thesis is no longer a value play.

However, the composite multiple is deceptive. It is an aggregate that blends high-flying semiconductor hype with lower multiple industrial leaders. The 19.8x figure fails to account for the unique composition of the Japanese balance sheet. Because many Japanese firms hold record levels of cash that generate negligible interest, the index Price is heavily distorted by stagnant assets that contribute almost nothing to the Earnings denominator.

### The Japan Discount

The market has historically applied a significant Japan Discount to these balance sheets, assuming that management would either hoard the cash indefinitely or incinerate it in low-ROE projects. This skepticism has merit; a yen in a vault is not worth a yen to a shareholder if the key is thrown away.

However, the opportunity in active selection lies in identifying the firms where the Japan Discount is no longer justified. The structural dismantling of cross-shareholdings and the TSE's aggressive capital efficiency mandates have created a coerced alignment between management and shareholders. The nearly ¥40 trillion in buybacks during 2024 and 2025 suggests that the cost of defending the vault is finally becoming higher than the cost of opening it.

## Is This a Bubble? (1989 vs. 2026)

With the TOPIX finally eclipsing bubble-era highs in 2024, and advancing another ~22% in 2025, the question is inevitable: Is this 1989 all over again?

The psychological scars of the 1990 burst — even more than 35 years later — are still pervasive. In the previously mentioned October 2025 BOJ policy speech, Takata invoked the term "bubble" *sixteen* times. This trauma is invariably anchored to one number: The Nikkei 225.

However, the Nikkei 225 is a flawed metric — a price-weighted index that severely distorts the reality of the modern economy (see **Appendix A** for a detailed breakdown). For this assessment, we rely exclusively on the TOPIX, a market-cap weighted index that captures the true breadth of Japan Inc.

## The 1955 Parallel: Fear of the “All-Time High”

Before addressing the valuation question, it is instructive to look at a strikingly reminiscent moment in American history. It is the story of a nation that — still haunted by the past — paused to debate whether “new highs” and a rapidly ascending market meant that another crash was possible.

The year was 1955. The Dow Jones Industrial Average had advanced significantly in the prior 18 months — up 44% in 1954 alone. The US Congress took notice. Fear of a 1929 repeat prompted Senators, led by J. William Fulbright, to commission a Stock Market Study, which culminated in Senate hearings.

Among those who testified was Benjamin Graham, the father of value investing. In oral testimony on March 11, 1955, he addressed three factors: “the present level of stock prices from the standpoint of the relationship between price and value. Secondly, causes of the rise in the market since September 1953; and thirdly, feasible methods of controlling excessive speculation in the future.” Graham’s assessment: **“leading industrial stocks are not basically overvalued, but they are definitely not cheap; and they are in danger of going over into an unduly high level.”**

In his written statement — often misquoted — Graham provided a more memorable summary:

*“With regard to the present level of stock prices, common stocks look high and are high, but they are not as high as they look.”<sup>24</sup>*

— Benjamin Graham, 1955

Overall, the hearings could be summarized as much ado about nothing. A market that was largely trading within a range of reasonableness was experiencing some degree of speculative behavior, but not anywhere near levels seen — and greatly incentivized — in 1929.

## 1989 vs. 2026—The Tale of the Tape

Japan in 2026 is Graham’s view of the US in 1955. While nominal prices are high, valuations are “not as high as they look”. The fundamental difference lies in the math of the risk premium and the quality of the balance sheet.

### The Bubble vs. The Recovery

Metric	1989	2026	2026 Assessment
P/E Valuation	60x – 70x	<b>19.8x</b>	Normalized
Earnings Yield	1.5%	<b>5.0%</b>	Attractive
10Y Bond Yield	5.7%	<b>2.14%</b>	Normalizing
Equity Risk Premium	-4.2%	<b>+2.86%</b>	Rational
Debt/Equity	2.2x	<b>0.6x</b>	Fortress

The comparison is unambiguous. In 1989, investors paid 60x earnings to earn 1.5%. Today, they pay 19.8x to earn 5.0%. The risk premium has completely inverted.

### The Valuation Reality Check

However, at 19.8x earnings, the TOPIX is not cheap. It prices in a base case where:


- **ROE remains at or above 8%** (vs. historical 6-7%)
- **Governance reforms are permanent** (not a one-time sugar high)
- **EPS grows 4-5% annually** (automation + pricing power)
- **The yen remains weak** (no currency reversion headwind)

This implies a ~9.5% expected return (~5.0% yield + ~4.5% growth), but with little margin of safety against a macro shock or a yen reversion headwind.

**For the enterprising investor desiring a 10% hurdle rate with downside protection, the passive TOPIX is unattractive.**

### ROE—The Critical Variable

Why is the market granting this generous multiple? Because the earnings quality has changed. **Figure 16** provides the answer. When we adjust for taxes to view the Real Net ROE, we see that corporate Japan spent the better part of the last three decades stuck in the Underperformance Zone — generating returns below the market’s implied 8% hurdle rate. This chronic shortfall meant that for every yen of earnings retained, the market consistently refused to grant a corresponding increase in market value — the market’s practical verdict on a value trap. The recent breakout above 8% ROE validates that structural reforms are working, marking a tectonic shift where Japanese capital is no longer being stranded, but is instead being priced for its ability to compound.

**Figure 16—Real Net ROE for Japan Inc.<sup>25</sup>**

### Can 8% Be Sustained?

In the post bubble era, Japanese net ROE has *never* sustained above 8% for more than a year or two. However, this time the drivers are structurally different:

- **Coercive Capital Allocation:** The TSE's "name and shame" regime acts as a de facto enforcement mechanism. Buybacks hit ¥20 trillion in 2025. Management teams are no longer hoarding cash to survive a crisis; they are deploying it to survive the governance crackdown. The threat of losing "Prime" status is the stick that ensures capital efficiency continues.
- **Balance Sheet Strength:** With Debt/Equity at **0.6x**, companies have enormous financial flexibility. Even if operating margins compress, the fortress balance sheet provides a cushion to sustain ROE through buybacks — a lever that was simply not available during the leveraged era of the 1990s.
- **The Productivity Wedge:** While Physical CapEx in *real* terms has barely grown over the last two decades (**Figure 8**), software CapEx has nearly tripled. The "Productivity Wedge" (**Figure 9**) is real — output per worker is detaching from cost per worker, generating a structural margin *expansion* that does not require top-line GDP growth to succeed.
- **Pricing Power is Real:** As **Figure 15** illustrates, Operating Profit margins have broken out to multi-decade highs, confirming that companies are finally playing offense — passing on raw material price inflation rather than just absorbing it.

### The Base Case Assessment

9% ROE is sustainable if the structural reforms remain in place. The risk is not cyclical reversion — it is policy abandonment. However, a sobering reality remains: 9% ROE is not 15% ROE.

Japan Inc. is generating acceptable returns, not exceptional returns. This is why the 19.8x multiple is “fair” but not “cheap”.

### **The Passive Index Risk**

Despite the structural positives, the passive trade is now increasingly fragile.

At 19.8x earnings, the TOPIX is pricing in a Goldilocks scenario. However, if the market re-rates Japan to a historical mid-cycle multiple of 15x, the resulting 25% contraction would be significant.

For the enterprising investor, the goal is no longer passive index exposure. The goal is to own the specific companies that have already bridged the gap between a shrinking labor pool and a 9%+ ROE.

### **The Antifragile Vetting Strategy**

Given the passive index risk, the superior strategy is to target the opportunity already created by the weak yen. While exporters currently benefit from a currency tailwind, their advantage is *fragile*; a reversion — as indicated by the PPP data (**Figure 4**) — could erode their earnings overnight.

In contrast, the stress test of the last few years has already identified select domestic firms that maintained margins despite higher input costs — proving their pricing power under real conditions.

We target these **antifragile** candidates because they demonstrate positive asymmetry across three dominant macro scenarios:

#### **I. Weak Yen Moat (Market Share Gain)**

If the yen remains weak, input costs stay elevated since Japanese companies are typically net importers of commodity inputs. Sub-scale domestic competitors, unable to pass on these costs, are forced to consolidate by attrition. A dominant domestic company with brand equity and pricing power uses this environment to step into the void, gaining volume as rivals exit the category.

**The Result:** Dominant domestic companies gain via Volume Growth (Market Share Consolidation).

#### **II. Interest Rate Hedge (Net Cash Floor)**

If there is a spike in JGB yields, this could lead to a significant compression of broad market equity multiples. Here, the dominant domestic company has a hidden defense: Net cash. As rates rise, the interest earned on their cash generates higher *ordinary* profit levels due to an uplift in interest earnings that buffers the valuation compression seen in the index.

**The Result:** Relative outperformance (Interest income offsets Multiple Compression).

### III. Yen Reversion (The Call Option)

If the yen eventually strengthens, the math becomes explosive for domestic companies with import commodity exposure. Imported input costs collapse, yet retail prices remain sticky due to brand inertia and lack of competition.

**The Result:** Dominant domestic companies gain via Margin Explosion (Input costs fall, prices stay high).

**The Catalyst:** This reversion does not require the BOJ to raise rates; it merely requires the U.S. Treasury to signal it will no longer tolerate yen weakness. This is not theory — in January 2026, the U.S. Federal Reserve conducted a highly unusual "rate check" intervention on behalf of the Treasury, which immediately triggered a repricing of the dollar.<sup>26</sup>

**Why?** The rationale is grounded in pure economic self-interest: a structurally weak yen acts as a hidden tariff on U.S. exports while subsidizing Japanese imports, widening the U.S.-Japan trade deficit. The Treasury's intervention serves as a *psychological* backstop, demonstrating a willingness to cap the dollar's strength to prevent further widening of this deficit and to protect U.S. manufacturers.

#### Antifragile Strategy Payoff

The antifragility lies in positive asymmetry across all three scenarios — limited downside in a weak yen environment or a spike in Japanese government bond (JGB) rates (but still capturing market share) — and explosive upside should the yen revert.

#### How To Capture Alpha

To execute this, look for companies that are *already* capturing share during the current weak yen environment. Look also for companies possessing pricing power in these tough conditions. Those that grow volume while *maintaining* margins have a proven moat.

#### A Stock Picking Framework

If TOPIX at 19.8x is fairly valued but offers insufficient margin of safety, where should the enterprising investor focus?

**The superior strategy:** Bypass the index entirely and concentrate in the ignored value cohort where METI reforms provide catalysts and balance sheets provide downside protection.

#### Screening Out the Noise

Screening within the value cohort of Japan can be challenging. There are just under 4,000 companies within the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The best tactic — right from the start — should be one of *exclusion* rather than inclusion. There are two basic screens that can be set up to capture opportunity. By varying the specific threshold of the operational metrics being screened for, one can broaden or narrow the results list.

Since every screener tool is different — and some better than others — it is best to provide general guidelines that can then be adapted to the unique strengths of the technique being used.

### Screening for Dominant Companies:

**Thesis:** Recession-resistant domestic company using automation to uphold or expand margins. For these firms, a weak yen acts as a filter that removes sub-scale rivals, while a strengthening yen acts as a massive subsidy to the bottom line.

#### Exclude:

- Revenue *compression* over last 5 years
- High Debt/Equity ratio
- Exporters (target companies with a low export-to-domestic sales ratio)

#### Include:

- Gross/Operating/Ordinary Margins (5YR Avg to identify trends during weak yen era)
- ROE/ROIC/ROCE (5YR Avg to confirm capital efficiency)
- P/E Trailing

### Screening for Bargain Companies:

**Thesis:** Companies trading below book value with a fortress balance sheet will be coerced by METI/TSE to return capital. Not a bet on earnings growth, but on balance sheet monetization — finding the “least bad” companies selling at a massive discount.

This is *potentially* a much simpler screen, but there are *many* companies trading under book value in Japan (more than *one thousand* by a recent screening effort). The strategy is to avoid the “value traps” (easier said than done). Include a series of *excluding* filters so that screening can be tightened or loosened to obtain a more targeted result.

**Suggestion:** Use the same quality metrics as the Dominant company screener and adjust to widen or narrow the search. In this way, poorer quality companies get screened out first.

#### Exclude:

- High Debt/Equity ratio
- Revenue *compression* over last 5 years
- Exporters

#### Include:

- P/B < 1
- Gross/Operating/Ordinary Margins (consistency here filters out the “value traps”)
- ROE/ROIC/ROCE
- P/E Trailing

### Embrace the Treasure Hunt

Screening is not an exact science; it is a game of patience. Set the bar low initially to get a feel for the industry averages, then tighten the criteria to narrow down the selections.

If a company stands out across these metrics, it warrants a deep dive. This is a treasure hunt that requires many iterations, but the goal is simple: **Find the companies where the balance sheet protects you and the pricing power pays you.**

## Risks To Japan Thesis

The case for investment in Japan is compelling — but macro and structural tailwinds do not guarantee returns. The path to realizing value is obstructed by several risks that can destroy capital if ignored. The enterprising investor should view these risks not as deterrents, but as filters. Used correctly, they provide a distinct competitive edge.

### 1. Macro Volatility (Inflation, Debt, & Currency)

**The Risk:** Japan faces a Fiscal Dominance trap. With public debt at **260%** of GDP, the BOJ faces a dilemma: raising rates to fight inflation could spike debt service costs, while moving too slowly risks a currency spiral.

**Mitigation:** Do not attempt to predict BOJ policy. Instead, select businesses that thrive *within* volatility. Equities with pricing power function as a superior hedge against fiscal instability; they can grow nominal earnings even as a currency depreciates. Focus on niche-dominant leaders with higher gross margins; these firms possess the structural resilience to compound value regardless of the currency or rate environment. If a company failed the Weak Yen Stress Test of 2022–2025, it is unlikely to survive the next shock.

### 2. The "Value Trap" & Governance Inertia

**The Risk:** Japanese companies have historically been cheap due to low ROE and poor governance. The risk is that Japan remains a value trap, or that domestic capital flees overseas via NISA rather than supporting the local market.

**Mitigation:** Look for evidence of action, not just promises. If a company has not increased total shareholder yield (dividends + buybacks) or reduced cross-shareholdings since the 2023 METI reforms, move on. Do not just screen for "cheap". Investors must apply a strict exclusion for *structural* value traps. A company can have a fortress balance sheet, but if it is dominated by an entrenched founding family or operates as a parent-subsidiary cross-listing (with controlling blocks exceeding 30–40%), management can potentially ignore TSE mandates. To ensure minority shareholders actually benefit, avoid firms with highly concentrated insider ownership. Seek management that acts as a partner.

#### **The Agency Risk: Value Trap to Value Catalyst**

A valid critique of this value thesis is the risk of capital misallocation. Historically, Japanese management was more likely to incinerate cash in low-ROE projects than return it to shareholders. However, the Japan Discount is narrowing because the structural protection of cross-shareholdings has been dismantled. Combined with the TSE's mandate to address P/B ratios below 1.0, management is now incentivized — if not coerced — to prioritize capital efficiency. The vault is no longer being defended by management. Record-breaking buybacks in 2024–2025 prove capital is being redistributed to the owners.

### 3. Demographic Headwinds

**The Risk:** Japan's shrinking population is a structural headwind that could lead to a contracting domestic market, offsetting gains from capital reallocation.

**Mitigation:** Screen for automation adoption. Companies increasing *Revenue Per Employee* while maintaining or expanding margins are building structural moats. Those merely cutting costs are managing decline. In a labor-shortage economy, the company that creates a digital moat — maintaining revenue with fewer employees — will see its margins expand while its weak competitors' margins contract.

#### 4. Liquidity & Market Structure

**The Risk:** Many Japanese companies trade at low volumes, and share prices can exhibit higher monthly volatility than US peers.

**Mitigation:** For the enterprising investor, this is a *feature*, not a bug. Volatility provides the opportunity to acquire stocks far below intrinsic value. Liquidity constraints keep institutional competition low, preserving attractive valuations. The solution is patience: use algorithmic execution to build positions steadily without driving up the entry price.

## Summary Conclusion

The mobilization of ¥1,700 trillion is not a theory — it is a visible reality. Capital is flowing. Margins are expanding. ROE has cleared the 8% hurdle. However, at 19.8x, the TOPIX prices in sustained excellence with almost zero margin of safety. The vault is open, but the opportunity lies where the passive index cannot follow: dominant domestic companies that have proven their pricing power in a high-cost environment, and profitable firms trading below book value. Both offer a margin of safety that the broader index does not provide.

Realizing this value is a multi-year thesis. The patient investor willing to endure short-term volatility will be rewarded as the market eventually reprices this structural shift.

Do not treat Japan as a macro trade. It is a stock picker's market. While the index prices in a growth trajectory that Japan Inc. has rarely sustained, individual securities ignored by passive flows remain undervalued. They do not yet reflect the generational shift in the mobilization of ¥1,700 trillion in investment capital — a shift that is just getting started.

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**About the Author:** *Timothy R. Doyle is an independent investor and researcher applying value investing principles and original quantitative analysis to equity markets.*

## Appendix A

### The Nikkei 225 Distortion—A House of Mirrors

As a price-weighted index, the N225 gives disproportionate weighting to share price regardless of economic footprint. This creates two critical structural failings: an extreme concentration driven by idiosyncratic price action, and a fundamental misrepresentation of the companies actually driving the economy. The index is a house of mirrors: high-priced outliers distort the index level, while the core companies — the true backbone of the Japanese economy — are largely ignored.

Ironically, for a nation defined by precision, the Nikkei 225 relies on an archaic price-weighting methodology that distorts economic reality.

### 1989 N225 Market Structure

A look at the composition of the N225 index at bubble height reveals how skewed it was. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese banks were the primary conduit for funding Japan Inc. The higher leverage present on Japan Inc. balance sheets was a direct result of this lending boom.

By 1989, the top ten companies by market capitalization (see below) represented approximately ¥102.4 trillion, or roughly 17.3% of the total market value of the TSE First Section. These companies were almost entirely domestic focused, infrastructure, and financial firms. By this stage, these entities were massive and highly levered. Their valuations were predicated on the massive latent profits of their own stock portfolios — through cross shareholdings — and their real estate holdings.

### 1989 Top 10 Japanese Companies by Market Cap:

Rank	Company	Sector	Market Cap (¥ trillion)	Market Cap %	Index Weight %
1	<b>Industrial Bank of Japan</b>	Banking	¥15.9	2.6%	0.4%
2	<b>Sumitomo Bank</b>	Banking	¥10.5	1.7%	0.3%
3	<b>Fuji Bank</b>	Banking	¥9.9	1.6%	0.3%
4	<b>Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank</b>	Banking	¥9.1	1.5%	0.3%
5	<b>Mitsubishi Bank</b>	Banking	¥9.1	1.5%	0.3%
6	<b>Tokyo Electric Power</b>	Utilities	¥7.2	1.2%	0.5%
7	<b>Sanwa Bank</b>	Banking	¥7.1	1.2%	0.3%
8	<b>Nippon Telegraph &amp; Tel.</b>	Telecom	¥23.0	3.8%	0%
9	<b>Toyota Motor</b>	Automotive	¥7.7	1.3%	0.2%
10	<b>Nomura Securities</b>	Financials	¥6.7	1.1%	0.3%
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>¥102.4</b>	<b>17.3%</b>	<b>2.9%</b>

Despite the market being driven largely by financial engineering, the N225 index itself reflected a completely different Japan. Not a single name among the top ten index weighted companies (below) represented even 1/225 of the overall Nikkei market cap. These ten companies — with

less than 1.5% of total economic influence — commanded nearly one-third of the price movement of the entire index.

### 1989 Top 10 Japanese Companies by N225 Index Weight:

Rank	Company	Sector	Market Cap (¥ trillion)	Market Cap %	Index Weight %
1	<b>Yoshihara Oil Mill</b>	Cooking Oil	¥0.09	0.015%	3.8%
2	<b>Katakura Industries</b>	Textile	¥0.14	0.024%	2.7%
3	<b>Teikoku Oil</b>	Oil & Gas	¥1.05	0.17%	2.4%
4	<b>Sony Corp</b>	Electronics	¥2.60	0.43%	5.5%
5	<b>TDK Corp</b>	Electronics	¥0.74	0.12%	3.5%
6	<b>Kyocera</b>	Electronics	¥0.96	0.16%	3.2%
7	<b>Fanuc</b>	Automation	¥1.45	0.24%	3.9%
8	<b>Toho Zinc</b>	Metals	¥0.21	0.03%	2.2%
9	<b>Shin-Etsu Chemical</b>	Chemicals	¥1.10	0.18%	2.3%
10	<b>Japan Radio</b>	Electronics	¥0.45	0.07%	2.0%
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>¥8.79</b>	<b>1.45%</b>	<b>31.5%</b>

The N225 of 1989 was more a measurement of speculative small-cap price action rather than the value of the banking sector, the actual driver of the Japan economy of the 1980s. Companies like Yoshihara Oil Mill and Katakura Industries — which were economically insignificant — held greater sway over the index's performance than the massive banks that were the primary conduit for funding Japan's stellar growth of the 1970s and 1980s. This distortion masked the overvaluation of the broader market while emphasizing the volatility of minor industrial players.

In spite of the distortion created by how the 1989 N225 index was constructed, it is still clear to see that — by the end of 1989 — the companies as a whole that made up the entire market were trading at high valuations and were highly levered. While these two factors were the underpinnings, the clear indicator that the entire market was overvalued was the relationship between the market earnings yield and the risk-free yield. Investors were willing to pay nearly four times more for risky assets (stocks) than they were willing to pay for holding risk-free bonds (10-yr JGB). This alone should have been enough to signal that *the Nikkei 225 of 1989 — especially since it provided an ever further mathematical distortion of an already expensive market — was never a good “risk-on” trade.*

### The 2026 N225 Market Structure

By 2026, the top ten companies by market capitalization (below) represent approximately ¥239.3 trillion, or roughly 23.4% of the total market value of the TSE market. These companies are more globally focused, technology, and financial firms.

The N225 has transformed from a domestic banking index into a basket of global industrial and technology powerhouses. Much of their wealth extends beyond Japan's borders.

**2026 Top 10 Japanese Companies by Market Cap:**

Rank	Company	Sector	Market Cap (¥ trillion)	Market Cap %	Index Weight %
1	<b>Toyota Motor</b>	Automotive	¥45.9	4.5%	1.1%
2	<b>Mitsubishi UFJ Fin.</b>	Banking	¥31.9	3.1%	1.0%
3	<b>SoftBank Group</b>	Tech/Invest	¥24.2	2.4%	8.3%
4	<b>Hitachi</b>	Industrial	¥24.1	2.4%	1.5%
5	<b>Sumitomo Mitsui Fin.</b>	Banking	¥20.8	2.0%	1.0%
6	<b>Sony Group</b>	Cons Disc.	¥20.5	2.0%	1.0%
7	<b>Tokyo Electron</b>	Semicond.	¥18.9	1.9%	5.9%
8	<b>Advantest</b>	Semicond.	¥18.5	1.8%	13.0%
9	<b>Fast Retailing</b>	Retail	¥18.0	1.8%	8.0%
10	<b>Mizuho Fin. Group</b>	Banking	¥16.5	1.6%	1.0%
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>¥239.3</b>	<b>23.4%</b>	<b>40%</b>

The 2026 N225 is even more distorted than 1989. The top ten companies fully comprise 46.5% of the index weighting. Of these ten, three are tech/semiconductor focused companies that account for 27% of the index weighting while only representing 6.1% of the economy. While four companies appear on both “top ten” lists — unlike the zero overlap of 1989 — the weighting mismatch remains egregious. The overlap suggests alignment, but the math enforces distortion.

**2026 Top 10 Japanese Companies by N225 Index Weight:**

Rank	Company	Sector	Market Cap (¥ trillion)	Market Cap %	Index Weight %
1	<b>Advantest</b>	Semicond.	¥18.5	1.8%	13.0%
2	<b>SoftBank Group</b>	Tech/Invest	¥24.2	2.4%	8.3%
3	<b>Fast Retailing</b>	Retail	¥18.0	1.8%	8.0%
4	<b>Tokyo Electron</b>	Semicond.	¥18.9	1.9%	5.9%
5	<b>TDK Corporation</b>	Electronics	¥4.8	0.5%	2.4%
6	<b>KDDI</b>	Telecom	¥10.5	1.0%	2.1%
7	<b>Shin-Etsu Chemical</b>	Chemicals	¥13.5	1.3%	1.8%
8	<b>Recruit Holdings</b>	Services	¥11.2	1.1%	1.8%
9	<b>Konami Group</b>	Entertainment	¥2.4	0.2%	1.6%
10	<b>Fanuc</b>	Automation	¥6.5	0.6%	1.6%
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>¥128.6</b>	<b>12.6%</b>	<b>46.5%</b>

Over 36 years after the Japan bubble, the 2026 N225 index — with ten companies alone comprising nearly 50% of the index weight (three are tech/semiconductor focused companies representing 27% of the index) — is now even *more* concentrated than the US Nasdaq 100, where price is driven by the highly volatile US technology sector. The Nikkei 225 is anything but a broad measure of the Japanese economy. Relying on this narrow and distorted lens to value Japan Inc. is dangerously flawed.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Charles T. Munger, "The Psychology of Human Misjudgment," in *Poor Charlie's Almanack: The Wit and Wisdom of Charles T. Munger*, ed. Peter D. Kaufman, Expanded 3rd ed. (Virginia Beach, VA: Donning Company Publishers, 2005), p. 450

<sup>2</sup> **Figure 1:** Japan BOJ Policy Rate vs Japan CPI - BOJ policy rate sourced from [boj.or.jp/en/statistics](http://boj.or.jp/en/statistics); Japan CPI sourced from [stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi](http://stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi)

<sup>3</sup> **Figure 2:** US Fed Funds Rate vs US CPI - Sourced from FRED FEDFUNDS; US CPI sourced from FRED CPIAUCSL

<sup>4</sup> **Figure 3:** The Big Mac Index - *The Economist Magazine*- Sourced from <https://github.com/TheEconomist/big-mac-data/source-data>

<sup>5</sup> **Figure 4:** JPY per USD PPP Estimate - Source: PPP conversion factor, Consumption (Local Currency Unit per \$) [data.worldbank.org](http://data.worldbank.org); Source: PPP conversion factor, GDP (Local Currency Unit per \$) PWT version 11.0; Source: JPY to USD Spot Exchange Rate (AEXJPUS) FRED

<sup>6</sup> Big Mac Price in 2006 versus 2025 - Source: [eatmyindex.com/cpountry/japan](http://eatmyindex.com/cpountry/japan); price in local currency (yen)

<sup>7</sup> **Figure 5:** Big Mac Index Real Pricing Power - normalized by: US CPI from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics at [bls.gov/cpi/](http://bls.gov/cpi/); Japan CPI at [e-Stat.go.jp](http://e-Stat.go.jp)

<sup>8</sup> **Figure 6:** Rising Nominal Wages - Derived from Ministry of Finance, *Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry: Salaries* - sheet 55; *Bonuses* - sheet 56; *Employees* - sheet 59; Japan CPI (2020-Base) All Items index sourced from Statistics Bureau of Japan; Complete Ministry of Finance Raw data set available at: <https://www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/reference/ssc/historical.htm>. (sheets 1 thru 70)

<sup>9</sup> **Figure 7:** CapEx vs. Depreciation - Derived from Ministry of Finance, *Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry: CapEx* - sheet 60; *Depreciation* - sheet 20

<sup>10</sup> **Figure 8:** Japan Inc. SW CapEx Growth - Derived from Ministry of Finance, *Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry: CapEx* - sheet 60; *Software CapEx* - sheet 61; *Plant & Equipment Excluding Software* - sheet 62

<sup>11</sup> **Figure 9:** The Productivity Wedge - Derived from Ministry of Finance, *Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry (Historical Data)*. Calculated using the summation method for Gross Value Added (GVA): *Operating Profit + Personnel Expenses + Depreciation Expenses*. **Productivity** is defined as GVA per employee; **Compensation** is defined as Personnel Expenses per employee. Data encompasses "All Industries (excluding Finance and Insurance)" to isolate the real economy.

<sup>12</sup> **Figure 10:** Fortress Balance Sheet - Derived from Ministry of Finance, *Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry: Cash* - sheet 2; *Net Assets* - sheet 35; *Retained Earnings* - sheet 39; *ST Debt* - sheet 25; *LT Debt* - sheet 31; *Bonds* - sheet 30

<sup>13</sup> **Figure 11:** Japan Corporate Vault Liquidity - Derived from Ministry of Finance, *Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry: Cash* - sheet 2; *Securities* - sheet 8; *Investment Securities* - sheet 21

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<sup>14</sup> **Figure 12:** Japan Household Wealth in Nominal Terms - Annual Report on National Accounts for 2024; 2020-Benchmark; Department of National Accounts, Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan - Table 5: Closing Stocks of Assets and Liabilities of Households; available at <https://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/menu.html>; Historical data from 1990–1993 utilizes the Cabinet Office System of National Accounts (SNA) 2000-Benchmark and is plotted as raw data, spliced at the 1994 intersection without ratio adjustment. This preserves the absolute values of the "bubble peak" but results in a visible reclassification shift between 1993 and 1994, particularly within the 'Fixed Assets' category, due to the government's transition to modern SNA accounting standards

<sup>15</sup> Takata, Hajime. "Economic Activity, Prices, and Monetary Policy in Japan: Japan as a Leading Asset Management Center." Speech at the Meeting of the Chugoku Economic Federation, Hiroshima. Bank of Japan, October 20, 2025. Available at: <https://www.bis.org/review/r251105k.pdf>.

<sup>16</sup> **Figure 13:** Japan Household Wealth in Real Terms - Derived from **Figure 12** data, normalized by Japan CPI

<sup>17</sup> See Endnote 15

<sup>18</sup> Ibid

<sup>19</sup> Yamaji, Hiromi. "Corporate Governance Reform 2025" - Presentation by the Group CEO, Japan Exchange Group, Inc., at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan, November 4, 2025. (via YouTube)

<sup>20</sup> The Statistics Bureau of Japan - Results of Two-or-more-person Households; sourced from <https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kakei/1561.html>

<sup>21</sup> Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," *Econometrica* 47, no. 2 (March 1979): p. 279

<sup>22</sup> **Figure 14:** Japanese Gross Profit Margins - Derived from Ministry of Finance, *Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry: Sales* - sheet 45; *Cost of Sales* - sheet 46

<sup>23</sup> **Figure 15:** Ordinary Profits Breakout - Derived from Ministry of Finance, *Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry: Sales* - sheet 45; *Operating Profit* - sheet 48; *Ordinary Profit* - sheet 53

<sup>24</sup> Graham, Benjamin. Statement on Factors Affecting the Buying and Selling of Equity Securities. Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, 84th Congress, 1st Session. Washington D.C., March 11, 1955, p. 545.

<sup>25</sup> **Figure 16:** Real Net ROE for Japan Inc. - Derived from Ministry of Finance, *Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry: Ordinary Profit* - sheet 53; *Net Assets* - sheet 35; Effective tax rate assumptions: Before 1998 50%, thru 2012 40%; thru 2016 35%; onward 30%

<sup>26</sup> Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, January 27–28, 2026," released February 18, 2026, <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20260128.pdf>. The official minutes explicitly noted there were "no intervention operations in foreign currencies" for the Fed's account. However, the minutes confirmed that the trading desk requested "indicative quotes" (a rate check) on the USD/JPY on January 23, 2026, acting "solely on behalf of the U.S. Treasury." This psychological intervention acted as a severe warning shot, causing the dollar to violently collapse from roughly ¥158.50 to ¥152.45 within days, proving that the U.S. Treasury acts as the ultimate backstop against terminal yen weakness. For contemporary reporting on the mechanics and market impact of this specific release, see Jim Edwards, "Fed confirms it obeyed U.S. Treasury request for an unusual 'rate check,' weakening the dollar against foreign currencies," *Fortune*, February 19, 2026.

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